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AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AINO.
TATE) WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
By ROY MORELAND**
Chapter 12. Judicial Remedies for Breach of Contract.
TOPIC 4. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Special Note.-This Topic deals with the specific enforcement of a
contract, the breach of which is either threatened or has occurred. It
includes judicial decrees, both affrmative and negative in form,
whether called a decree for specific performance or an injunction. It
does not include remedies that are available where no contract exists
or where no breach has occurred or is threatened. It does not include
reformation of documents or declaratory decrees of rescission. The
discharge of contractual duties by repudiation or. non-performance Is
dealt with in Chapter 13 on "Discharge of Contracts" and in Chapter 10
on "Conditions and Breach of Promise as an Excuse for Failure to
Perform a Return Promise."
SECTION
358. Inadequacy of money dam-
ages as ground for spe-
cific enforcement.
359. Discretionary character of
the remedy and of the
terms of the decree.
360. Specific enforcement of
contracts for the transfer
of land.
361 Factors 'involved in the
determination of the ade-
quacy of damages.
362. Effect of the defendant's
insolvency on the remedy
of specific enforcement.
SECTION
363. Damages or restitution in
lieu of specific enforce-
ment.
364. Specific enforcement of
the whole when damages
would be an adequate
remedy as to part.
365. Specific enforcement in
part, with compensation
for the remainder.
366. Promises bindifig solely
because of a writing, a
seal or nominal consider-
ation.
367. Effect of unfairness, hard-
ship, mistake and inequi-
table conduct.
* This is a continuation of the Kentucky Annotations to the Re-
statement of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank
Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky, assisted by the
other members of the faculty in co-operation with the Kentucky State
Bar Association. The Topic on Specific Performance was annotated by
Professor Roy Moreland. William Fanning, Ashland, a graduate of the
College of Law, University of Kentucky, rendered valuable assistance.
This will be the last of the annotations to the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts to be published in the Kentucky Law Journal. The
American Law Institute will publish the restatement annotated with
Kentucky Decisions in book form within a short time.
** Roy Moreland, A. B., Transylvania College, 1920; LL. B., "with
distinction," University of Kentucky College of Law, 1923; J. D., Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, 1928. Professor of Law, University of
Kentucky College of Law; contributor to various legal periodicals.
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SECTION
368. Enforcement of a promise
to render a performance
that is impossible, illegal,
or a breach of duty to a
third person.
369. Specific enforcement de-
nied if contrary to the
public welfare.
370. Uncertainty of terms.
371. Difficulty of enforcement
372. Mutuality of remedy.
373. Requirements of security
that the 4greed exchange
will be rendered.
374. Performance of condi-
tions; provisions involv-
ing penalty or forfeiture.
SECTION
376. Effect of breach by the
plaintiff.
376. Specific enforcement in
favor of one having power
to terminate.
377. Specific enforcement
against one havinq power
to terminate
378. Effect of a provision for a
penalty or liquidated dam-
ages.
379. Contracts for personal
service.
380. Enforcement of negative
duties that accompany af-
firmative promises.
Section 358. Tadequacy of Money Damages as Ground
for Specific Enforcement of Contract.
(1) A decree for the specific performance of a contract,
either in the form of an affirmative or a negative order, will be
granted against a party who has committed a breach, or is
threatening one, if the remedy in damages would not be adequate
and the requirements of the rules stated in the other sections of
this topic are satisfied.
(2) The existence of a remedy other than money damages
for breach of a contract is not in itself a suffiient reason for
refusing specific enforcement; but it may properly be considered
with other facts in exercising the judicial discretion that exists
as stated in Section 353.
Annotation:
(1) The Kentucky decisions are apparently in perfect accord
with this statement of the law. Our court used this phraseology in
one instance: "An agreement will be specifically enforced where the
specific thing or act contracted for and not mere pecuniary compen-
sation is the redress practically required; and in such cases where
there is good faith, valuable consideration, clean hands, and no unrea-
sonable hardship to result to the defendant, it is as much a matter of
course for the chancellor to decree specific performance of a contract
as it is for a court of law to give damages for its breach and specific
performance will not be denied simply because the party asking for
it may have the right to recover for the breach." Louisville Southern
Bly. Co. v. Ragland, 15 Ky. L. R. 814 (1894) (contract to grant annual
pass for life in consideration of rifht of way given); Cumberland Tel.
and Tel. Co. v. City of Hickman, 129 Ky. 220, 111 S. W. 311 (1908)
(where citizens of a city sued to compel a telephone company to exer-
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else its franchise by operating its plant); L. d W. Rl. Co. v. Zaring,
9 Ky. L. R. 107 (1887) (where in consideration of a deed to a right of
way the railroad agreed to make "a safe and convenient crossing" so
that plaintiff could have access to the turnpike road); Flege v. Coving-
ton d Cin. Elevated Riy. Co., 122 Ky. 348, 91 S. W. 738 (1906) (where
a railroad covenanted to build a retaining wall along the line of plain-
tiff's lot and to keep same in repair). In the above cases specific per-
formance was granted in the form of an affirmative order.
Relief was granted in the form of a negative order in the follow-
ing cases: Schmidtz v. I. & M. Ry. Co., 101 Ky. 441, 41 S. W. 1015
(1897) (where bondholders sued to compel by mandatory injunction
the continued operation of a railroad); Sutton, Etc. v. Head, 86 Ky.
156, 5 S. W. 410 (1887) (where a grantee covenanted "no intoxicating
liquors are to be sold on the premises in less quantities than five gal-
Ions". The'court intimates in this case, p. 156, that an important fac-
tor influencing them to allow injunction was that it would avoid a mul-
tiplicity of actions); Grant County Board of Control v. Allp in, 153
Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417 (1913) (where a co-operative marketing asso-
ciation sued to enjoin the violation of a contract by a member to de-
liver his crops to the association for four years); Stovall v. McCutchen,
Etc., 107 Ky. 577, 54 S. W. 969 (1900) (where merchants of a town en-
tered into a, contract binding themselves to close their stores at a
certain time eachevening). Also, see Potter v. Dark Tob. Growers
Co-op. Assn., 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923), and Friedberg, Inc. v.
McClary, et al., 173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917).
The court in Edelen, Etc. v. W. 1. Samuels and Co., 126 Ky. 295,
303, 103 S. W. 360, 362 (1907) (contract to make whiskey over a long
period), states the rule slightly differently from the court in Louis-
vile So. Ry. Co. v. Ragland, supra, "The right to a decree of specific
performance of a contract is based upon the equitable principle that
the ordinary common law remedy of damages for a breach will not
afford a full and adequate remedy for the injury arising from the fail-
ure to carry out its terms--." Specific performance, however, was not
given in this case because of the adequacy of the remedy at law,
weight being given also to the fact that the court would be forced to
minutely supervise the performance, if allowed.
As stated in the latter part of subsection one, the requirements of
the Sections 359-380 must be satisfied before the court will grant spe-
cific performance.
If there is a probability that damages awarded cannot in fact be
collected, the court will grant a decree in its discretion. See cases
collected under clause (d) of the annotation to Section 361.
If there is a probability that full compensation cannot be had
without multiple litigation, the court may grant a decree in its dis-
cretion. See cases collected under clause (e) of the annotation to
Section 361.
As to the effect of the fact that compensation in money would be
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an adequate remedy for failure to render one part of the promised
performance, see the annotation to Section 364.
As to the effect of unfairness, hardship, mistake, or inequitable
conduct, see the cases collected In the annotation to Section 367.
As to promises binding solely because of a seal, a writing, or nomi-
nal consideration, see the cases collected in the annotation to Section
378.
There is dictum in this state to the effect that a violation of a
contract for the services of an artist of special merit, where it con-
tains negative covenants, will be restrained by injunction. Cain v.
Garner, 169 Ky. 633, 185 S. W. 122 (1916). See Section 380.
Where a chattel is unique, the remedy at law is not adequate. It
was held in Bteinway 4 Son v. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884
(1923), that a piano was not such a unique chattel as to be the subject
of a decree of specific performance unless the plaintiff showed that
other pianos of equal qualities could not be bought in the market.
Chattels real are generally held the subject of decrees for specific
performance. Where a landlord refused to put a tenant in possession
of leased premises, the lease was enforced, both landlord and prior
tenant being proper parties to such suit. Mattingly's Exr. v. Brent, 155
Ky. 570, 159 S. W. 1157 (1913),
(2) No cases.
Section 359. Discretionary Chracter of the Remedy, and
of the Terms of the Decree.
(1) If the remedy in damages is found by the court to be
inadequate, the determination of whether specific enforcement
shall be decreed and what shall be the terms of the decree rests
in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject to the
rules stated in Sections 360-380.
(2) The decree need not be absolute in form, and the per-
formance that it requires need not be identical with that prom-
ised in the contract; it may be so drawn as best to effectuate the
purposes for which the contract was made, and it may be granted
on such terms and conditions as justice requires.
Comment:
a. The exercise of sound judicial discretion is something other
than decision by arbitrary whim or by emotional desire or as a per-
sonal favor. There are working rules that are to be applied, as may
be seen in the other Sections of this Topic. But at almost every step
In the application of these rules, the court must determine the exist-
ence of many facts and must weigh their relative importance as parts
of an Inter-related whole. How great is the degree of uncertainty in
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amount of harm? Are the terms of a contract unfair, oppressive, or
unconscionable? Is the hardship of enforcement disproportionate to
the need for enforcement? To what extent is the public interest in-
volved? The solution of questions like these requires judicial experi-
ence and knowledge of life; and the process is described as the exer-
cise of sound judicial discretion.
b. The finction of the court is to do complete justice; and it has
power to mold its decree to that end. The mandatory order may be
directed against the plaintiff, when properly requested, as well as
against the defendant; it may be conditional upon some performance
to be rendered by the plaintiff or by some third person, such as making
a money compensation for defects or the giving of security; it may
even be conditional upon the plaintiff's assent to the modification of
the contract that he seeks to enforce. The flexibility in the form and
the terms of the decree require a sound judicial discretion in every
step in its drafting.
c. The exact performance that is promised in a contract may be,
In part or in whole, very difficult of enforcement, it may have become
impossible or unlawful, and it may be such that exact enforcement
would work unreasonable hardship. The court may nevertheless be
able to achieve substantially the same result without undue difficulty,
without hardship to'the defendant, and without violation of law or of
the rights of third persons. In such cases the decree may be so drawn
as best to achieve this result. It may command a performance by the
defendant that is not identical with that which he promised to per-
form; it may create an economic pressure to induce an affirmative per-
formance for the plaintiff, as by an injunction excluding the defendant
from similar transactions with third parties (see Section 380, dealing
with negative promises). The rule stated in Subsection (2) shows
that the court's power is not confined by narrow mechanical limits;
but it also indicates that the power must be used only to effectuate
the purposes of the contract. There is greater freedom in limiting the
decree by imposing conditions on enforcement than in varying the
performance that is to be compelled. The burden of obedience to an
ill-considered order may be made so great as to be unreasonable and
out of proportion to the harm that it is intended to prevent. The
rules stated in Sections 360-380 indicate limits within which the power
of the court is exercised.
d. There are circumstances under which the court has power, by
virtue of its own decree and without commanding any performance at
all, to create substantially the same legal effects that the promised
performance would have created. A contract to make a will or to
execute a deed transferring specified land cannot be specifically per-
formed after the promisor's death; but the transfer of such land can
nevertheless be compelled and it will be compelled if the rights of
third persons have not intervened. The same is true of a contract that
a child shall, by adoption or otherwise, be given certain rights as
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heir; the court may be able to create these rights in the child, even
though it has become impossible for the promisor to create them, by
reason of his death or disability. There are statutes in many States
empowering the court to effect the transfer of title to land by virtue
of its own decree or the deed of an officer without the execution of a
deed of conveyance by the previous owner.
Annotation:
(1) Kentucky cases are in accord. While the remedy is generally
spoken of as resting in the discretion of grace of the chancellor, this is
more a form of expression than an accurate definition of the rights of
the Injured party as to his remedy by specific performance. In other
words, while the chancellor has a discretion, it is not an arbitrary but
a legal discretion. Edelen v. W7. B. Samuels d Go., 126 Ky. 295, 103
S. W. 360 (1907); Posey v. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S. W. 703 (1912).
A more careful expression of the rule is: "The right of specific per-
formance is not an absolute right, and whether the same will or will
not be enforced in a given case rests in the sound judicial discretion
of a chancellor, to be exercised by him after a full consideration of
all the facts and circumstances and equities involved." Hogg v. For-
sythe, 198 Ky. 462, 248 S. W. 1008 (1923). Similar statements may be
found In Clifton Land Co. v. Reister, 186 Ky. 155, 216 S. W. 342 (1919);
Robinson v. Yann, 224 Ky. 56, 5 S. W. (2d) 271 (1928); Warren v.
Goodloe's Rxr., 230 Ky. 514, 20 S. W. (2d) 278 (1929). And so, spe-
cific performance has been refused where the enforcement of a con-
tract would be unfair adid inequitable. Polk v. White, 9 Ky. Opinions
185 (1876); Jones v. Prewitt, 128 Ky. 496, 108 S. W. 867 (1908); Lex-
ington d Eastern Ry. Co. v. Williams and Wife, 183,Ky. 343, 209 S. W.
59 (1919); harsh and oppressive, Eastland v. Vanarsdel, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb)
274 (1814) ; Darnell v. Alexander, 178 Ky. 404, 199 S. W. 17 (1917) ; or
would do one party great injury and the other but comparatively little
good, Mc~utcheon's Heirs v. Rawleigh, 25 Ky. L. R. 549, 76 S. W. 50
(1903). Likewise, specific performance has been refused where the
consideration for the promise sought to be enforced was grossly in-
adequate. Woollums v. Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S. W. 781 (1892); Wo7-
ford v. gteele, 27 Ky. L. R. 88, 84 S. W. 327 (1905); Cox V. Burgess, 139
Ky. 699, 29 Ky. L. R. 972, 96 S. W. 577 (1906); Lexington & Eastern Ry.
Co. v. Williams and Wife, 183 Ky. 343, 209 S. W. 59 (1919); where the
contract was induced by inequitable conduct, sharp practice, and mis-
representation, Hart v. Diggs, 10 Ky. Opin. 206 (1878); Robenson v.
Yann, 224 Ky. 56, 5 S. W. (2d) 271 (1928); Taylor v. Johnson, 248 Ky.
280, 58 S. W. (2d) 392 (1933); where the parties made a mistake as
to the quantity of land, Smith v. Smith, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 81 (1815);
Fannin v. Bellemy, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 663 (1869); where the obligor by
reason of his own mistake entered into the contract and the obligee
was not injured by the refusal of specific performance, Louisville Ry.
Ca. v. Kellier-Dehler Realty Co., 148 Ky. 765, 147 S. W. 424 (1912);
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where the complainant has slept on his rights, and acquiesced for
great length of time, Pona Greek Coal Co. v. Coleman, 204 Ky. 221, 263
S. W. 748 (1924); Glenn v. Lowther, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S. W. 947 (1927);
and where it appeared that a decree would call for an undue amount
of supervision by the court, Edeem v. Bamuels, 126 Ky. 295, 103 S. W.
360 (1907) (contract to manufacture whiskey over long term of years).
Language in accord with this subsection will be found in a score or
more cases. Specific application of the rule will be found in many
cases under Sections 360-380.
Subsection (2).
This subsection, in effect, illustrates the discretion given the chan-
cellor in making his decree. Thus, in Tyree v. Williams, 6 Ky. (3
Bibb) 365 (1814), where the contract was for the exchange of land
with a warranty, one of the parties became insolvent. Specific per-
formance was decreed on the condition that a solvent person join in
the warranty. And, in Hagins v. Sewell, 124 Ky. 588, 30 Ky. L. R. 750
99 S. W. 673 (1907), (where a deed contained a provision whereby the
vendee was to build a party wall), the vendee failed to erect the wall
within time prescribed. The vendor sued for specific performance. The
court held that the vendor was entitled to a judgment for the cost of
the wall in case the vendee should fail to perform within the time
allowed by the court. And, where there is an encumberance on prop-
erty contracted to be sold which can be satisfied out of the purchase
money, the court may decree that this be done and specific perform-
ance be granted. Poor v. Mechanics Bank, 144 KY. 682, 139 S. W. 840
(1911). And, see the decree in Posey v. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S. W.
703 (1912).
However, under this section the Court has no right to formulate
an entirely new contract between the parties and against the objec-
tion of either or both of them adjudge its specific performance. L. & X.
R. R. Co. v. Herd, 14 Ky. L. R. 670 (1893). And, see Wheeler v. Gahan,
206 Ky. 366, 371, 267 S. W. 227, 229 (1924.)
Section 360. Specific Enforcement of Contracts for the
Transfer of Land.
Damages are regarded as an inadequate remedy for the
breach of a promise
(a) to transfer any interest in specific land, or
(b) to buy and pay for such an interest, so long as the
transfer has not yet been made.
and specific enforcement will be decreed, subject to the rules
stated in Sees. 359-380.
Comment:
a. The remedy in money damages for breach of a contract for
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the transfer of a specific tract of land is regarded as inadequate with-
out regard to quantity, quality, or location. A specific tract is unique
and Impossible of duplication by the use of any amount of money.
Specific performance Is available to enforce a contract the purpose of
which is the transfer of any recognized interest In land to the pur-
chaser, even though it is less than a fee simple.
b. The fact that the vendee has made a contract for the resale of
the land to a third person does not deprive him of the right to specific
performance. He will be liable in damages for breach of this new
contract, and these damages cannot be accurately determined without
litigation. He has a right that the vendor shall make the transfer as
agreed, in order to enable him to perform specifically his contractual
duty to the new vendee and to avoid litigation and the payment of such
damages.
c. Before conveyance has been made by the vendor his remedy in
damages is not an adequate one. He cannot get judgment for the full
price, because he still has the land. His damages are usually meas-
ured by the contract price less the value of the land retained; but the
land Is a commodity that has no established market value, and the
vendor may not be able to prove what his real harm will be. Even
if he can make this proof, the land may not be immediately convertible
Into money, and he is deprived of the power to make new invest-
ments. Prior to getting a judgment, the existence of the contract,
even though broken by the vendee, operates as a clog on salability, so
that it may not be possible to find a purchaser at any fair price. In
addition, the fact that specific performance is available to the vendee
Is of some weight, because of the rule as to mutuality of remedy (see
Sec. 372 (2) ).
d. . . .
e . . . .
f. All requirements for the granting of a decree for specific per,
fdrmance, other than the inadequacy of money damages, are applicable
to executory contracts for the sale of land as in other cases.
Annotation:
Kentucky decisions, with the exception of Cox v. Sharpe, 1 Ky. Op.
358 (1866), are in accord with this section. The section may be prop-
erly construed as stating that where land is the subject matter of a
contract, there is a conclusive presumption that damages will not
afford an adequate remedy. Such Is the weight of authority and the
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that Section 361 points
out the factors to be considered in determining the adequacy of dam-
ages- "as to contracts other than for a transfer of an interest in
land." Furthermore, the section reads, "subject to the rules stated in
Secs. 359-380." Section-358, making inadequacy of money damages the
ground for specific enforcement of a contract, is not included in the
limitation. Note also, Comment (a).
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In a minority line of cases in other jurisdictions the fundamental
rule of equity jurisdiction, as stated in Section 358, is applied to land
contracts. There are those who consider this the proper test of equity
jurisdiction in all cases, including land contracts. See Hume, "Spe-
cific Performance of Contracts to Sell Land", 21 Ky. L. Jour. 348;
Jones, 22 Ky. L. Jour. 143; Bird and Fanning, 23 Ky. L. Jour. 380.
The rule of the Restatement is supported by Cox, 16 Ky. L. Jour. 338.
The rule that the common law remedy of damages does not afford
an adequate remedy for the threatened breach of land contracts dates
back to early Kentucky decisions. It has been accepted and applied
consistently without question or discussion, with the exception of the
decision in Cox v. Sharpe, to be discussed infra. Thus, in Mills v.
Metcalf, 8 Ky. 477 (1819), the court said, "as the contract is for the
sale of land, there is no doubt but that, according to the settled doc-
trine in equity, . . . the chancellor's aid in obtaining specific per-
formance might be obtained." Accord, M'Gee v. Beal, 13 Ky. 190
(1823).
Either vendor or vendee is entitled to relief. The vendor was
permitted an action in M'Gee v. Beal, 13 Ky. 190 (1823), and Johns v.
Union Ice Cream Co., 145 Ky. 178, 140 S. W. 145 (1911). The vendee
was allowed specific performance in Baxter v. Brand, 36 Ky. 296
(1838); Honaker v. Honaker, 5 Ky. Op. 543 (1871). Relief will be
granted to the assignee of the vendee, Benjamin v. Dinwiddie, 226 Ky.
106, 10 S. W. (2d) 620 (1928) (dictum). Relief has been granted
where the contract was for a fee, Hart v. Brand, 8 Ky. 159 (1818);
Johns v. Union Ice Cream Co., 145 Ky. 178, 140 S. W. 145 (1911);
Clifton Land Co. v. Reister, 186 Ky. 155, 216 S. W. 342 (1919); or for
a lease, Mattingly's Executor v. Brents, 155 Ky. 570, 159 S. W. 1157
(.1913); or for an exchange, Overstreet v. Rice, 67 Ky. 1 (1868); to
repair and maintain a right of way, Flege v. Covington & Cincinnati
Elevated Railway & Transfer'& Bridge Company, 122 Ky. 348, 91 S. W.
738 (1906).
Cox v. Sharpe, 1 Ky. Op. 358 (1866), is the only case which we
have found differing with the rule of the restatement. See, however,
the dictum in Edelen v. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 303, 103 S. W. 360,
362 (1907). In the Cox case the court laid down the following propo-
sition: "When a party to a sale of real estate has an adequate legal
remedy for a breach of the contract by the other party, a court of
equity will not enforce a specific execution unless it is necessary for
justice. In this case, so far as we can judge from the record, the
vendee has neither parted with anything, nor has been, or will be,
subject to any special damage or inconvenience by a failure to get the
legal title. It does not even appear that he would lose a fair specu-
lation. On the contrary, a dismissal of his bill for a conveyance
would leave both parties equitably in statu quo." The case is some-
what complicated by a dispute as to the terms of the contract and the
refusal of the vendor's wife to release her dower interest, but it is our
opinion that the rule laid down in the case cannot be explained away
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and that it is contra to the restatement and to other Kentucky decisions
on the question.
Section 360 closes with the following provision: "... specific
performance will be decreed, subject to the rules stated in Secs. 359-
380." As stated in Comment (f) to the restatement, the effect of this
provision is that all requirements for the granting of a decree for
specific performance, other than the inadequacy of money damages,
are applicable to execufory contracts for the sale of land as in other
cases.
The Kentucky cases are in full accord with the restatement on
this point and with the interpretation of it as quoted above from Com-
ment (f). The standard expression in Kentucky is, "The right of spe-
cific performance of course is not an absolute right, and whether the
same will or will not be enforced in a given case rests in the sound
judicial discretion of a chancellor, to be exercised by him after full
consideration of all the facts and circumstances and equities involved."
Hogg v. Forsythe, 198 Ky. 462, 248 S. W. 1008 (1923). Again, in
Posey v. Kimsey, 146 Ky. 205, 142 S. W. 703 (1912), the court pointed
out that the discretion to be exercised by the chancellor is not "an
arbitrary or capricious one, but a sound judicial one controlled by
established equitable principles." Some cases quote a section from
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, to illuminate the matter. This section
may be found, Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 14th Ed., Sec. 1027. Lan-
guage similar to that quoted above may be found in almost every case
For example, see Hart v. Brand, 8 Ky. 159 (1818); Woollums v. Hors-
ley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S. W. 781 (1892); Cocanougher v. Green, 93 Ky. 519,
20 S. W: 542 (1892)y; Ratterman v. Campbell, 26 Ky. L. R. 173, 80
S. W. 1155 (1904); Faraday Coal & Coke Co. v. Owens, 26 Ky. L. R.
243, 80 S. W. 1171 (1904); Jones v. Prewitt, 128 Ky. 496, 108 S. W. 867
(1908); Wren v. Cooksey, 147 Ky. 825, 145 S. W. 1116 (1912); Blue-
grass Realty Co. v. Shelton, 148 Ky. 666, 147 S. W. 33 (1912); Clifton
Land Co. v. Reister, 186 Ky. 155, 216 S. W. 342 (1919); Kentucky,
Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Corporation v. Clark, 247 Ky. 438, 57 S. W.
(2d) 65 (1933). The court has repeatedly quoted Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisdiction, Sec. 1404, in attempting to lay down the limits of dis-
cretion. See, also, the annotation to Section 359.
Although the court states consistently in these cases that spe-
cific performance lies in the discretion of the chancellor, it Is sub-
mitted that no Kentucky case, other than Cox v. Sharpe, will be found
where the chancellor's discretion Is considered as extending to the
point of inquiry into the adequacy of damages.
In the case of M'Gee V. Beall, 13 Ky. 190 (1823), a court of equity
granted relief to the vendor although the contract was fully executed
on his part. This case is not in conflict with Section 360 (b), for
although the vendor has a remedy at law, where he would be able to
recover the same as in a court of equity, it happened that he held a lien
on the land for the purchase money, and, therefore, had a right to
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resort to equity to enforce the lien. The court did not subject the
land to be sold in virtue of the lien, but it might have done so.
Section 361. Factors Involved in the Determination of the
Adequacy of Damages.
In determining the adequacy of the remedy in damages, as
to contracts other than for the transfer of an interest in land,
the following factors are influential and may singly or in com-
bination justify specific enforcement:
(a) the degree of difficulty and uncertainty in making an
accurate valuation of the subject matter involved, in determining
the effect of a breach, and in estimating the plaintiff's harm;
(b) the existence of sentimental associations and esthetic
interests, not measurable in money, that would be affected by
breach;
(c) the difficulty, inconvenience, or impossibility of ob-
taining a duplicate or substantial equivalent of the promised
performance by means of money awarded as damages;
(d) the degree of probability that damages awarded can-
not in fact be collected;
(e) the probability that full compensation cannot be had
without multiple litigation.
Comment:
a. The enumeration that is made in the Section does not purport
to be exclusive of all other factors; nor are the enumerated factors
mutually exclusive and independent of each other. When the remedy
in damages is regarded as adequate to do justice, specific performance
is not available to the injured party. The question of Its adequacy
turns upon the opinion that is formed by the court after weighing all
the factors that exist in the particular case.
Illustrations:
3. A contracts to sell to B the 21-foot racing sloop "Pollyanna",
this sloop being one of a class of substantially identical boats manu-
factured by a particular boat builder. Although other boats of this
class are easily obtainable in the market, A knows that B believes that
the 'ollyanna" is a witch in light airs and is, therefore, superior to
most of the others. To prove that another of the class is her equal
it would be necessary to try out an indefinite number of such boats in
a series of races. A decree compelling A to sell the sloop as agreed
may properly be granted.
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Annotation:
(a) There are cases where the adequacy of the plaintiff's remedy
Is dependent on the difficulty and uncertainty of valuing the subject
matter of the contract. This, it would seem, is the basis of the deei-
bion in Louisville d Southern R. R. Co. v. Ragland, 15 Ky. L. R. 814
(1894), where an agreement by defendant railroad to give plaintiff an
annual pass over its road during his life was specifically enforced.
Accord, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Zaring, 9 Ky. I. R. 107 (1887) (agreement
to construct and maintain a crossing for benefit of plaintiff); Ander-
son v. Mt. Bterling Telephone Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 868, 86 S. W. 1119 (1905)
(agreement to furnish plaintiff with a telephone).
There are, of course, many cases in this jurisdiction, where the
court decreed specific performance because of the difficulty and uncer-
tainty in estimating the plaintiff's harm in damages. In many cases
it is "impossible to estimate in money the damages for non-perform-
ance". Flege v. Covington & Cincinnati Elevated Railway d Transfer
d Bridge Co., 122 Ky. 348, 28 Ky. L. R. 1257, 91 S. W. 738 (1906); Owen
County Burley Tobacco Society, Etc. v. Brumback, 128 Ky. 137, 32
Ky. L. R. 916, 107 S. W. 710 (1908); Con. v. Collins, 75 Ky. 386 (1876);
Grant County Board of Control v. Alphin, 152 Ky. 280, 153 S. W. 417
(1913). It is apparent, however, that "extreme diffiiculty" or some
other phrase short of "absolute impossibility" is sufficient. In some
cases there is "impossibility" in the literal sense. In other cases the
damages are "conjectural" (Louisville d Nashville R. R. Co. v. Zaring,
9 Ky. L. R. 107 (1887), or "the breach could not well be measured in
damages" (Grant County Board of Control v. Allphin, supra), or it is
"impractical" to attempt to estimate them, etc. The section provided
that the "degree" of diffiiculty in estimating damages will be con-
sidered. That flexible standard is the test rather than "absolute im-
possibility". A reading of the Kentucky cases bears out this deduction.
(b) We have found no Kentucky case based exclusively on the
existence of sentimental associations or esthetic interests. However,
specific performance has been denied, and one of the grounds for such
denial was said to be the failure to allege a sentimental, peculiar, or
unique quality in the subject matter of the contract, Steinway & Sons
V. Massey, 198 Ky. 265, 248 S. W. 884 (1923).
(c) An agreement will be specifically enforced where the specific
thing or act contracted for and not mere pecuniary compensation is
the redress practically required. Louisville Southern R. R. Co. v. Rag-
land, 15 Ky. L. R. 814 (1894) (contract to give annual pass for life);
Schmidt v. Louisville d N. R. Co., 101 Ky. 441, 41 S. W. 1015 (1897)
(obligation to operate a railroad); Anderson v. Mt. Sterling Tele-
phone Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 868, 86 S. W. 1119 (1905) (contract to place a
telephone in home); Owen Couny Burley Tobacco Socetdy v. Brum-
back, 128 Ky. 137, 32 Ky. L. R. 916, 107 S. W. 710 (1908) (contract to sell
crop of tobacco to growers' pool); Cumberland Telephone & TelegrapP
Co. v. City of Hickman, 129 Ky. 220, 33 Ky. L. R. 730, 111 S. W. 311
K. L. J.-4
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(1908) (suit to compel a telephone company to exercise its franchise
by operating its plant); Grant County Board o7 Control v. AlZlphn, 152
Ky. 280, 153 S.W. 417 (1913) (contract to pool tobacco); H. Friedberg,
Inc. Y. Mc0lary, 179 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917) (sale of tobacco,
which plaintiff had contracted to resell to third persons); Bteinway
& Sos v. Massey, 198 Ky. 264, 248 S. W. 884 (1923) (dictum, sale of
new Steinway piano); Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers Uo-operative
Association, 201 Ky. 441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923) (contract to pool to-
bacco); Talamini v. Rosa, 257 Ky. 228, 77 S. W. (2d) 627 (1935) (con-
tract for sale and transfer to plaintiff of shares of stock not readily
obtainable elsewhere).
(d) The factor stated in this clause has been considered in two
Kentucky cases, both injunction suits to restrain breach of contract,
and mentioned in two other cases.
Where damages would fully compensate for the injury and the
defendant is solvent and able to respond, an injunction restraining a
breach of contract will not be granted. Campbell v. Irvine Toll Bridge
Co., 173 Ky. 313, 190 S. W. 1098 (1917). The court treated as signifi-
cant the.fact that the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant was
insolvent, or that difficulty would be encountered in collecting of de-
fendant by execution the amount of any judgment for damages. In
H. Friedberg, Inc. v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917) one of
the grounds for an injunction was the fact that the defendant was in-
solvent and, consequently, unable to respond in damages. The court
approved the view that insolvency of the defendant is often an added
ground, but might be the sole ground for granting specific perform-
ance.
And, see, Madison v. Chinn, 26 Ky. (3 J. J. Marsh.) 230, 232 (1830);
Thurston v. Bailey, 157 Ky. 29, 162 S. W. 525 (1914).
(e) Our court has approved this factor in several cases. In
Stovall v. Mcutcheon, 107 Ky. 577, 21 Ky. L. R. 1317, 54 S. W. 969
(1900), the court said: "The recurring' breach each day of the con-
tract would require numerous actions at law, and by different plain-
tiffs, as well; or, if not, there would at least be a continuing damage
up to September 1st. It has repeatedly, if not universally, been held
that injunction is proper in either of these classes of cases, to pre-
vent a multiplicity of actions, or to prevent a repeated and recurring
cause of action." And, see, Hutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 9 Ky. L. R. 453,
5 S. W. 410 (1887) (covenant not to sell intoxicating liquors on prem-
ises); Friedberg, Inc. v. MeClary, 173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1913).
Section 362. Effect of the Defendant's Insolvency on the
Remedy of Specific Enforcement.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the performance
required will constitute a preference of one creditor over others
that is inconsistent with the purpose of an existing bankruptcy
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statute or of other rules of law governing the distribution of
insolvent estates. In case where the performance required will
not constitute such a preference, the existing or prospective in-
solvency of the defendant will be considered in determining the
adequacy of the remedy in damages.
Comment:
a. Compare in respect to the final sentence of this Section, Section
361 (d).
b. •
c. A decree for the specific performance of a wholly executory
contract that provides for a fair exchange of equivalent performances
will not operate as a preference over other creditors, because the estate
of the insolvent will be enriched as much as it is depleted. But if the
contract is executory only on the part of the insolvent, to enforce spe-
cific performance will generally operate as a preference in favor of the
plaintiff over other creditors.
d. The performance of a contractual duty may be the transfer of
land or goods, and the other party may have not only a contractual
right to such a transfer, but also property in such land or goods. In
such cases, the law protects the interest of the property owner; and
even though the obligor is insolvent, a decree for specific performance




1. A borrows money of B and contracts to transfer to him as
security ten shares of stock in the X Company, without creating in
B any property in any specific shares. A dies insolvent without having
kept his promise to transfer the shares. B sues A's administrator for
specific performance. The decree will not be granted, because 'it
would compel the administrator to commit a breach of duty as trustee
of the assets in his charge.
2 . . .
3. . . .
4. A contracts to sell Blackaere and all the farm machinery there-
on to B for $5,000 paid in advance, but neglects to convey as agreed.
A's subsequent insolvency will not prevent B from getting specific
performance of this contract, because B has acquired a property in-
terest in both the land and the machinery and a decree for specific
performance will cause no improper preference.
5. A Is the owner of an interest in a ship, the title to which is
held by B in trust for A and others. B is insolvent. A assigns his
interest to C; and B contracts to effectuate the transfer to C of A's
interest and to terminate his own power. It Is proper to decree spe-
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cific performance of B's promise in favor of such a grantee. The fact
that B is insolvent does not make available to his creditors the interest
in the ship that belonged to A; and it tends strongly to show that the
remedy in damages against B is not adequate.
a. .
Annotation:
In Kentucky there are no decisions affirmative in form, directly
in point upon the subject matter of this section. The reader's atten-
tion, however, is called to the "Special Note" at the beginning of
Topic 4. It is stated there that this topic includes judicial decrees,
both affirmative and negative in form, whether called a decree for spe-
cific performance or an injunction. See, therefore, H. Friedberg, Inc.
v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917) (injunction to restrain
breach of contract), where the insolvency of the defendant was a
material factor in the decision. The court in this case approved the
view that the insolvency of the defendant is often an added ground,
and, in many cases, the sole ground for an injunction, where, were it
not for such insolvency, an action for damages would be an adequate
remedy.
And, see, the dictum in Campbell v. Irvine Toll Bridge Company,
173 Ky. 313, 315, 190 S. W. 1098, 1099 (1917) (motion to dissolve a
mandatory injunction compelling defendants to accept plaintiff as a
lessee), that the insolvency of the defendant will be considered in de-
termining the adequacy of damages as a remedy. See American Snuff
Company v. Walker, 175 Ky. 149, 193 S. W. 1021 (1917).
See, also, the dictum in Thurston v. Bailey, 157 Ky. 29, 162 S. W.
525 (1914) where the plaintiff asked for a decree affirmative in form
and the court implied that, had the time for performance arrived, he
might have had specific performance, if he had alleged and shown the
inability of the defendant to pay damages. This dictum is in accord
with the restatement.
This section of the restatement is a good statement of the pres-
ent condition of the law on the insolvency of the defendant as a juris-
dictional factor in equity. See Horack, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 702; More-
land, 22 Ky. L. Jour. 1. The above cases indicate a view in accord
with the restatement.
Section 363. Damages or Restitution in Lieu of Specific
Enforcement.
If a plaintiff in good faith sues for specific enforcement,
and that relief is denied, damages or restitution may be awarded
in the same proceeding, subject to the rules applicable to those
remedies.
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Comment:
a. The rule stated in the Section was adopted by courts of equity
in order that complete justice might be done without the necessity of
bringing another action In a different court. In many jurisdictions,
the power of the courts to afford the remedy of damages or restitu-
tion, in a suit for specific performance, Is governed by statutes pro-
viding for the liberal amendment of pleadings or uniting law and
equity jurisdiction in a single system of courts. The present Section
does not deal with the procedure appropriate for obtaining the substi-
tuted remedy or with the defendant's right to a trial by jury.
Illustrations:
1. A makes a contract for the conveyance of land to B and later
wrongfully repudiates it. B brings suit to compel specific perform-
ance, in ignorance of the fact that A has already transferred the land
to an Innocent purchaser for value. The remedy asked will not be
granted; but the court may award damages in lieu thereof.
2. A brings suit against B for specific performance of B's con-
tract to sing leading roles 'in grand opera, knowing that the remedy
will be refused under the rule stated in Section 379. Damages will
not be awarded in lieu thereof, unless there is an applicable statute
permitting It.
Annotation:
Our decisions, generally, are in accord. McConnell's Heirs v. Dun-
lap's Devisees, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 44 (1805); Jones v. Shackleford, 5 Ky.
(A Bibb) 410 (1811); Gerault v. Anderson, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 543, 544
(1812); Warlord v. Uamron, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 434 (1814); Rankin v.
Maxwell, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 488, 489 (1820); Thomas v. Haly Coal
Co., 189 Ky. 698, 225 S. W. 1053 (1920). Reading v. Ford's Heirs, 4 Ky.
(1 Blbb) 338 (1809), is apparently contra as to the requisite of good
faith.
Where specific enforcement is denied, in order for the plaintiff to
recover damages, his petition must ask for them. Davis d Campbell
v. Gleave's Heirs, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 142 (1824). But a prayer for gen-
eral relief is sufficient. Gerault v. Anderson, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 543
(1812); Thomas v. Haly Coal Company, 189 Ky. 698, 225 S. W. 1053
(1920). A prayer for general relief made by amended petition is also
sufficient. Warford v. Camron, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 434 (1814).
If It appears that the suit for specific performance or damages is
solely for the purpose of recovering damages, they will not be awarded.
The remedy is at law, Bradford v. Long, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 225 (1815);
$laughter v. Nash, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 322 (1822); Fisher's Heirs v. Kay,
5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 434 (1811) (dictum); Reading v. Ford's Heirs, 4 Ky.
(1 Bibb) 338 (1809) is contra. However, if the plaintiff is in doubt as
to whether the contract can be specifically enforced, damages will be
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awarded, if it in fact cannot be specifically enforced. Slaughter v.
Tindle, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 358 (1822).
Where specific performance is denied, restitution of the parties to
the status quo may be decreed. McDermed v. McCastand, 3 Ky.
(Hardin) 21 (1805); Speers v. Sewell, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 239 (1868);
Usher's Exr. v. Flood, 83 Ky. 552 (1886); Asler v. Brock, 95 Ky. 270,
24 S. W. 1070 (1894); Barnes v. Beverly, 17' Ky. L. R. 586, 32 S. W.
174 (1895); Lowe v. Maynard, 115 S. W. 214 (1909).
Section 364. Specific Enforcement of the Whole When
Damages would be an Adequate Remedy as to Part.
The fact that compensation in money would be an adequate
remedy for failure to render one part of the promised perform-
ance does not prevent a decree specifically enforcing the contract
as a whole, if in all other respects the requisites for granting
the remedy of specific enforcement exist.
Comment:
a. Compensation in money may be an adequate remedy for the
failure to render one part of a promised performance and at the same
time be inadequate as to another part. In such cases, justice requires
complete relief in a single action. This relief may properly be a
decree for the specific performance of the entire contract, if there is
no sufficient reason for refusing the decree other than the adequacy of
damages as a remedy. The decree may therefore be molded in such
manner as will best afford a complete remedy under the existing cir-
cumstances. The rule in respect to the awarding of two kinds of relief
in the same decree is stated in Section 365.
Illustrations:
1. A contracts to sell his land with buildings and stock in trade
to B. In case of breach, a decree specifically enforcing the entire
performance promised by A may properly be granted, even though
the stock in trade is of a kind that could be purchased elsewhere. It
is also within the court's discretion to require A to convey the land
and to pay damages for failure to deliver the stock. If B has dis-
posed of some of the stock so that it cannot be recovered, complete
relief necessarily requires the awarding of damages (see Section 365).
Annotation:
There are no Kentucky decisions upon this point. Our court tends
to render complete relief in a single action, if it is possible. See the
cases collected under Section 365, infra.
A. L. I. RESTATMMNT OF THm LAw OF CONTRACTS 289
Section 365. Specific Enforcement in Part with Compensa-
tion for the Remainder.
The fact that a part of the promised performance cannot
be rendered, or is otherwise such that its specific enforcement
would violate some of the rules stated in Sections 360-380, does
not prevent the specific enforcement of the remainder, if in all
other respects the requisites for specific enforcement of that re-
mainder exist. Compensation for the partial breach that still
remains may be awarded in the same proceeding, either as dam-
ages, restitution, or an abatement in price. An indemnity
against threatened future harm may also be required.
Comment:
a. Part of the performance promised by the defendant may be
impossible to be rendered or may be of such a character as to make
specific performance unavailable for other reasons. In either case, If
the requisites for granting the remedy exist with respect to a part, in
spite of the fact that they do not exist as to the remainder, a decree for
the specific performance of that part, with compensation in a just and
proportionate degree as to the remainder, may properly be granted.
b. Sometimes the remedy in damages is fully adequate as to the
part of the contract that is still possible of specific enforcement. Some-
times the specific enforcement of only a part of the promised perform-
ance will cause unreasonable hardship and bring the rule stated in
Section 367 into operation or cause results unforeseen when the con-
tract was made and substantially different in character from any
expected from or required by the contract. The plaintiff may have had
knowledge that full performance was impossible, and the defendant
may not have had such knowledge. Facts such as these must be con-
sidered in determining whether specific performance of part of a con-
tract, with compensation or an abatement in price will be decreed
under the rule stated in the section.
c. A vendor of land who can not perform as agreed by reason of
a shortage in area or a defect in title may be decreed to transfer all
that is within his power, with compensation or indemnity for the par-
tial breach. The court has wide discretion in the character of the
remedy given for the shortage or defect. It may be compensatory dam-
ages, restitution of money already paid, or a proportionate abatement
of the price that has not yet been paid. The apportionment will take
Into consideration acreage, improvements, and relative values of the
parts involved. An indemnity also may be required against future
harm; and in some cases such an indemnity may be the only remedy
that is necessary. ...
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Illustrations:
4. A contracts to convey a perfect title to Blackacre to B. A's
wife, who has a dower interest in the land, refuses to join in the deed.
B may properly be given decree that A shall transfer all his interest
In the land, with either an abatement in price measured by the differ-
ence in value caused by the non-conveyance of the dower Interest or
with sufficient indemnity against future injury to B in case A's wife
survives him and enforces her rights.
5. A, who is a celebrated artist, contracts to sing in opera at
B's theater for a specified period and during that time not to sing in
a competing theater in the same city. The fact that specific perform-
ance of A's affirmative promise to sing for B will not be decreed is not
in itself sufficient to prevent the specific enforcement of A's negative
promise by injunction. For other illustrations of this type, see Illus-
trations 6-9 under Section 380.
Annotation:
Kentucky is in accord with the rule of this section. All of the
cases decided upon the point have involved contracts for the sale of
realty.
In the early case of Mconnell's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, 3 Ky.
(Hardin) 44 (1805), our court laid down the proposition that an under-
taking to sell a larger interest than the vendor owns does not relieve
him from carrying out the contract as to the interest he does own
with compensation for the remainder. The rule has been consist-
ently followed since that time. The cases indicate that the court has
wide discretion in the character of the remedy given for the short-
age or defect. It may be compensatory damages, restitution of money
already paid, or a proportionate abatement of the price that has not
yet been paid. Generally, where the vendee has sued, the court has
permitted him to elect which of these remedies he desired, the form of
the relief depending upon his election, limited, however, in some in-
stances by circumstances of the individual case. McConnell's Heirs v.
Dunlap's Devisees, supra; Jones v. Shacklefor, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 410
(1811); Kelly's Heirs v. Bradford, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 317 (1814); Rankin
v. Maxwell's Heirs, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. Marsh.) 488 (1820); Morgda's Heirs
v. Barnes' Heirs, 20 Ky. (4 T. B. Mon.) 291 (1827); Preece v. Wolford,
196 Ky. 710, 246 S. W. 27 (1922); Wheeler v. Gahan, 206 Ky. 366, 267
S. W. 227 (1924) (dictum).
If the principal part of the contracted property is destroyed be-
tween the time when the contract is made and the time when it is to be
performed, the court will not grant specific performance with abate-
ment of price commensurate with the loss. Wheeler v. Gahan, supra
(here buildings on the land, which constituted the chief value of the
property, were destroyed by fire).
Where the inability of the vendor to convey the agreed interest
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arises from the refusal of his wife to join in the conveyance and re-
lease her dower Interest, the vendee may have specific performance
with abatement in price, the abatement to be measured by the pres-
ent value of the wife's potential right of dower. Will B. Miller Com-
pany v. Bannon, 221 Ky. 677, 299 S. W. 567 (1927); City of Murray v.
Holcomb, 243 Ky. 287, 47 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1932). Formerly, the rule
was probably different. Plum v. Mitchell, 16 Ky. L. R. 162, 26
S. W. 391 (1894). However, in this case the wife was not made a
party to the action, and the case is not quite clear. Query: Is the
wife a necessary party under the present rule?
In Kentucky the rule stated in this section has been qualified to
the extent that specific performance with compensation will not be
granted in favor of a purchaser who at the time the contract was
made, knew that the vendor had a limited interest in the land. Haag
v. Dixon, 151 Ky. 768, 152 S. W. 930 (1913).
If the deficiency in title or subject matter contracted to be con-
veyed is considerable and material to the purchaser's enjoyment of
what he purchased, specific enforcement at the suit of the vendor as
to the part that may be conveyed with abatement for the remainder
will not be decreed. L. d N. R. R?. Co., v. Fuson, 203 Ky. 708, 262 S. W.
1086 (1924) (discrepancy of fifty per cent held too great). However,
In McConnell's Heirs v. Dunlap's Devisees, supra, the court granted
specific enforcement at the suit of the purchaser with compensation
for the remainder, although the deficiency was fifty per cent. These
cases Indicate the fact that the court is more apt to decree specific
performance, where deficiency is rather material, if the suit is by the
vendee rather than by the vendor. However, even where the vendee is
suing the rule has its limitations, as illustrated by Wheeler v. Gahan,
supra, where the court refused specific performance with compensation
at the suit of the purchaser, where five-sixths of the value of the prop-
erty was destroyed. If the discrepancy is trifling, and the vendor offers
to make a proper reduction in the price, there is no objection to en-
forcement of the vendee's promise. Coleman's Exr. v. Meade, 76 Ky.
(13 Bush) 358 (1877) (dictum).
In connection with this section the reader should consider the
annotation to Section 375, as to specific performance with compensa-
tion, where the vendor is plaintiff.
Section 366. Promises Binding Solely Because of a Writ-
ing, A Seal or Nominal Consideration.
A contract that is binding solely by reason of its being
under seal, or in writing, or having a nominal consideration
will not be specifically enforced, unless some perfoimance con-
stituting a fair exchange is a condition of the defendant's duty.
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Comment:
a. . . .
b. In order that specific performance may be available as a rem-
edy, it is not enough that the promise is in a sealed writing or that a
merely nominal consideration was actually given (see Secs. 81, 82).
This does not mean that adequacy of consideration, in the sense of
equivalence of market values is necessary, except to the degree that
the rule stated in Section 367 may require. If there is a legally en-
forceable contract, it is enough that the contractual obligation Is
based upon any of the following elements (this enumeration not being
necessarily exhaustive): (1) A substantial consideration in exchange
for the promise; (2) a substantial performance rendered in the past
and causing the making of the promise as belated compensation there-
for; (3) substantial action in justifiable reliance on the promise; (4) a
substantial performance to be rendered as a condition of the defend-
ant's duty and as an exchange for the performance that is specifically
decreed.
Illustrations:
1. For the express consideration of $1, A makes a 'written con-
tract under seal to transfer valuable land to B. The latter holds this
contract for several years, reasonably believing that A will keep his
promise, but makes no such change of position as would in itself, irre-
spective of the seal, make A's promise binding. These facts are not
sufficient to entitle B to a decree for specific performance.
2. A promises in a writing under seal to make a gift of land to
his daughter B. The latter, in reliance thereon, takes possession of
the land, makes it her home for many years, and builds valuable Im-
povements upon it. B can get a decree for specific performance of A's
promise. A's promise would be binding, even in the absence of the
seal, because of substantial action in reliance upon it by B (see Sec.
90). The contact therefore is specifically enforceable under the rule
stated in Section 358.
3. . .
4. A gives B a sealed option for thirty days to buy certain land
for $10,000. Within the thirty days, and with knowledge /that A has
repudiated the contract, B notifies A of his acceptance. B can get a
decree for specific performance, conditional on payment of the price.
The option was binding only because of a seal; but after acceptance
the contract becomes a bilateral one for the exchange of performances
of value, and the decree will be made conditional upon performance of
the agreed exchange by the plaintiff.
An'wtation:
Kentucky decisions are in accord with the rule of this section.
The distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments has been
abolished in Kentucky by statute. Kentucky Statutes, See. 471.
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An agreement in writing will not be enforced merely because it is
solemnized by the signature and seal of the party. Buford's Heirs v.
McKee, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 107 (1833). Nor will equity enforce a mere
promise to make a gift, where there is no consideration to support
the promise, although it is in writing. Rain v. Sturgeon's Acmr., 5 Ky.
Opin. 575 (1872) (dictum).
Our court early announced the rule that a "consideration either
good or valuable Is necessary in every contract which equity will en-
force". Banks v. May's Heirs, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh.) 435 (1821);
Buford's Heirs v. McKee, supra (valuable or meritorious considera-
tion); Northup v. Ward, 12 Ky. L. R. 735, 15 S. W. 247 (1891) ($1
for a half interest in mineral rights held insufficient).
Kentucky has repeatedly held that a consideration of one dollar
Is not sufficient to support a mineral option in equity. IAtz v. Goosling,
93 Ky. 185, 19 S. W. 527 (1892); Berry V. Frisbie, 120 Ky. 337, 27 Ky.
L. R. 724, 86 S. W. 558 (1905); Noble v. Mann, 32 Ky. L. R. 30,
105 S. W. 152 (1907); Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S. W. 662
(1912) (five dollars recited consideration); Stamper v. Combs, 164 Ky.
733, 176 S. W. 178 (1915). In these cases the court takes the view
that the consideration is merely nominal and, hence, specific enforce-
ment is denied. However, considerable doubt has been cast upon these
decisions by Thomas, J., in the recent case of Union Gas & Oil Co. v.
Wiedeman Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S. W. 323 (1925). In the case of
other options one dollar has been held to be sufficient consideration.
Sparks v. Ritter, 204 Ky. 623, 265 S. W. 26 (1924); City of Murray v.
Holcomb, 243 Ky. 287, 47 S. W. (2d) 1026 (1932).
Section 367. Effect of Unfairness, Hardship, Mistake and
Inequitable Conduct.
Specific enforcement of a contract may be refused if
(a) the consideration for it is grossly inadequate or its
terms are otherwise unfair, or
(b) its enforcement will cause unreasonable or dispropor-
tionate hardship or loss to the defendant or to third
persons, or
(c) it was induced by some sharp practice, misrepresenta-
tion, or mistake.
Comment:
a. If a party is induced to make a contract by the fraudulent
representations of the other, it is voidable; and after avoidance no
remedy for its enforcement is available to the defrauder. The present
Section, however, includes practices that are not fraudulent, represen-
tations that are innocefit, and mistakes by the defendant in which the
plaintiff does not participate and for which he is not at all responsible.
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Even though the plaintiff's conduct has not been such as to cause a
court to refuse him a judgment for damages or even such as to entitle
the defendant to any affirmative remedy against him, it may be such
as to disentitle him to the remedy of specific performance.
b. Mere pecuniary inadequacy of consideration will not generally
make the terms of a contract seem too unfair for enforcement unless
the degree of inadequacy is extreme. The court will consider all the
other facts of the case before determining the existence of the neces-
sary degree of unfairness. A slight inadequacy of consideration, ac-
companied by other facts, such as are enumerated in the Section, may
prevent specific enforcement, even though no one of the existing facts,
standing alone, would be sufficient. Such facts exist in varying com-
binations and in each case must be considered as a whole. The appli-
cation of the rule stated in the Section must depend upon the moral
standards of enlightened judges.
IBlustrations:
2 . . .
3. B is the owner of land X. A is a manufacturer who intends
to locate a factory in the town where land X lies. A does not dis-
close his intention to B. In consideration of $100 in cash, B contracts
to sell his land to A at the latter's option for $10,000 If paid within
three months. Ten thousand dollars is a fair price for the land at
then existing market prices. Later, A's intentions become generally
known, prices of land rise immediately, and B repudiates his con-
tract. A brings suit for specific performance within the three months
and pays $10,000 into court. On these facts, the decree asked by A
may properly be granted.
4. A contracts to sell to B Lot No. 23, as indicated on a recorded
plan, for $600. This price is fixed by A at 20c per foot, the area of the
lot being believed by him to be 3,000 square feet. In fact, the lot contains
9,000 square feet. B knows that the lot is much larger than A sup-
poses; but he does not know just how the price was determined. The
court may properly refuse a decree for specific performance, even
though there may have been no such mistake or fraud as would prevent
B from maintaining an action for damages.
5. .
6. A effectively conveys a right of way to B, a railroad company,
and B contracts in return to maintain a convenient road crossing for
A's use. Later B is compelled by public authority to raise its tracks
fifteen feet, in order to eliminate a grade crossing over another rail-
way. B builds a fifteen-foot embankment and offers to maintain a
grade crossing for A if he will permit the use of his own land for the
necessary approaches. A refuses this and demands the building and
maintenance 6f a tunnel. The cost of such a tunnel would be $5,000.
The total value of A's land is $1,500. Specific enforcement against B
may properly be denied, and damages may be awarded instead.
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7. . .
8. A leases land to B for a term of years and gives to the latter
an option to buy it at a named price at any time before the termina-
tion of the lease. Later the property is greatly, increased in value by
reason of sewers, pavements, and sidewalks constructed by public an-
thority and assessed against A as owner of the land. When the lease
was made, the possibility of these improvements and assessments was
not contemplated by the parties. In a suit for specific performance
by B, the court may properly make its decree conditional upon b's pay-
ing a just share of the assessments in addition to the contract price.
Annotation:
Kentucky is in accord with the rules of this section:
(a) Our Court lays down the princple that it "will not specifically
enforce a hard and unreasonable bargain where the ability and knowl-
edge of the contracting parties is so unequal as to result in one being
overreached, and his property sacrificed by the inadequacy of the
consideration". Wolfor v. Steel, 27 Ky. L. R. 88, 90, 84 S. W. 327
(1905) ($1.50 for mineral rights worth $15 to $25 per acre); Woollums
v. Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S. W. 781 (1892) (40c for mineral rights
worth $15 per acre).
As intimated in the above quoted extract from Wol/ord v. Steele,
supra, mere inadequacy of consideration is probably not alone suffi-
cient to justify a refusal to grant specific performance, but is a fact
which, coupled with other circumstances showing the unfairness of
the contract, may be sufficient to justify the court in refusing relief.
Darnell, et al., v. Alexander, 178 Ky. 404, 199 S. W. 17 (1917); specific
execution of a contract in equity is a matter not of absolute right in
either party, but of sound and reasonable discretion in the court, and
will never be adjudged except when it is strictly equitable to do so.
Cocanaugher v. Green, 93 Ky. 519 (1892). Nor is the fact that the prop-
erty has depreciated in value, or increased in value, between the time
of the making of the contract and the time for performance a sufficient
ground for refusing specific performance. Wren v. Cooksey, 147 Ky.
825, 145 S. W. 1116 (1912); Cox v. Burgess, 139 Ky. 699, 96 S. W. 577
(1906) (this case expresses the rule admirably, in substance that,
although equity will not sanction a contract founded upon fraud, impo-
sition, mistake, undue advantage, or gross misapprehension, or where,
from a change of circumstances or otherwise, it would be unconscion-
able to enforce it, nevertheless it will not attempt to substitute the
judgment or business sagacity of the chancellor for that of the con-
tracting party, nor to relieve one of his bad bargain when fairly en-
tered into, pp. 703, 704).
Disparity In age, experience, and mental condition of the parties
to a contract which is hard and unconscionable may result in the
denial of specific performance. Woollums v. Horsley, supra; Ratter-
mnan v. CamPbell, 26 Ky. L. R. 173, 80 S. W. 1155 (1904) (eighty-year-
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old man induced to name a much lower price than his property was
worth); Eastland v. Vanarsdel, 6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 274 (1814).
(b) A contract resulting in disproportionate loss to the defend-
ant will not be specifically enforced. L. & B. By. Co. v. Willams and
Wife, 183 Ky. 343, 209 S. W. 59 (1919) (plaintiffs use of a right of
way, for which he had paid very small consideration would result in
a flooding of defendant's land); Polk v. White, 9 Ky. Op. 185 (1876)
(enforcement inequitable and oppressive); Williamson v. Dils, 114 Ky.
162, 72 S. W. 292 (1903) (vendee, required by contract to survey land,
was driven off by force and threats, and rendered unable to survey, and
was held not amenable to an action for specific performance); Jones
v. Prewitt, 128 Ky. 496, 108 S. W. 867 (1908) (enforcement unjust and
inequitable); Bluegrass Realty Co. v. Shelton, 148 Ky. 666, 147 S. W.
33 (1912) (vendor sought to reserve burial ground in plot sold by the
deed, but such reservation was not in title bond. Held: It would be
unjust to require specific performance in view of the purpose for
which the vendee desired the land); Darnell v. Alezander, supra.
The rule as stated by this clause is limited by our Court in the
recent case of Rogers Brothers Coal Devel. Go. v. Day, 222 Ky. 443,
1 S. W. (2d) 540 (1927), in the following language: "the rule is not
applicable except where such consequences cannot be deemed to have
been contemplated by the parties at the time of the making of the
contract sought to be specifically enforced."
Where the hardship on the defendant has been brought about by
the delay of the complainant in performing his part of the contract,
and an adequate compensation for such delay cannot be ascertained,
specific enforcement will be denied. Meaux v. Heim, 2 Ky. (Sneed)
252 (1803). This case is also authority for the proposition that where,
in a contract for the conveyance of real estate, the vendor dies and
suit is brought by the vendee against the vendor's heirs for specific
execution, the fact that the vendor's executors had obtained'judgment
for the consideration agreed to be paid will not be considered such
confirmation as will bind the heirs to specific execution of a hard, un-
conscionable contract.
If to- specifically enforce an agreement would cause one party great
injury and bring the ofher but comparatively little good, its execution
will not be required. McCutcheon's Heirs v. Rawleigh, 25 Ky. L. R. 549,
76 S. W. 50 (1903).
(c) Our Court will refuse to enforce a contract that was induced
by inequitable conduct, sharp practice, misrepresentation, or mistake-
Eastland v. Vanarsdel, supra; Louisville By. Co. v. Kelner-Dehler
Realty Co., 148 Ky. 765, 147 S. W. 424 (1912) (defendant not required
to take lots because he was unintentionally deceived as to their prox-
imity to his own land); Robenson v. Yann, 224 Ky. 56, 5 S. W. (2d) 27-1
(1928) (agreement between plaintiffs and parties controlling auction
sale whereby lots were sold at much lower price than that bid by
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plaintiffs at auction); Meaux v. Helm, supra (delay by plaintiff amount-
ing to fraud).
Our Court has never defined the term "sharp practice", but it is
well settled in this state that failure to communicate material facts
of which fair dealing demands the disclosure, will preclude specific
performance of contracts between vendor and vendee-Bowman v.
Bates, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 47 (1810) (vendee connived with vendor's agent
to prevent vendor from finding out the true value of the land to be
sold); Woollums v. Horsley, supra; Welford v. Steele, supra.
In many of the cases involving sharp practice, the vendor was
old, uneducated or inexperienced, while the vendee was an alert ex-
perienced trader, or had the trust and confidence of the vendor. Byrne
v. Long, 12 Ky. L. R. 910, 15 S. W. 778 (1891) (vendor, while intoxi-
cated, was induced by vendee to sign a contract of sale which the
vendee represented was only a lease); Wolford v. Steele, supra; Dar-
nell v. Alexander, supra (vendee was nephew of vendor); Hart v.
Diggs, 10 Ky. Op. 206 (1879) (vendor, physician of vendee with great
influence over him, sold him a house at a high price while intoxicated);
Taylor v. Johnson, 248 Ky. 280, 58 S. W. (2d) 392 (1933) (false state-
ments as to amount house to be sold was renting for).
Where the plaintiff knowingly deceived the defendant, specific per-
formance of a contract will be denied-Eastland v. Vanarsde7, supra;
Darned v. McCarty, 9 Ky. L. R. 638, 6 S. W. 153 (1887) (fraudulent
warranty as to fitness of a Jack); Warfield v. Erdman, 19 Ky. L. R.
1559, 43 S. W. 708 (1897) (false representations in regard to value and
quality of land); Meaux v. Helm, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 252 (1803). But it
will also be denied, where the defendant was induced by the misrep-
resentations of the plaintiff to enter into the contract, even if mis-
representations were innocently made. Matthey v. Wood, 75 Ky. (12
Bush) 293 (1876); Louisville Railway Co. v. Kellner-Dehler Realty Co.,
supra (slightly stronger case, evidence strongly tending to show active
concealment, rather than unintentional misrepresentation).
In some cases a mistake by the parties, though not sufficient to
prevent the formation of a contract or to give equitable ground for its
reformation or rescission will nevertheless, excuse liability in a suit
for specific performance-Eastland v. Vanarsdel, supra (gross or pal-
pable error together with unreasonable hardship on defendant);
Smith v. Smith, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 81 (1815) (mistake as to amount of
land conveyed); Fannin v. Bellamy, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 663 (1869) (simi-
lar mistake). Unilateral mistake is ground upon which an equity
court may refuse specific performance, Louisville Ry. Co. v. Kellner-
Dehler Realty Co., supra. Unilateral mistake has been held a suffi-
cient ground upon which an equity court may refuse specific per-
formance.
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Section 368. Enforcement of a Promise to Render a Per-
formance that is Impossible, Illegal, or a Breach of Duty to a
Third Preson.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the performance
sought is impossible, or is tortious or criminal, or is in violation
of the rights of a third person which are superior to those of
the plaintiff. If the rights of the plaintiff and those of a third
person are equal, the court may prorate performances.
Comment:
a. Impossibility of performance sometimes prevents the forma-
tion of a contract and sometimes discharges an existing contractual
duty (see Sections 455, 456). Specific performance will not be decreed
in cases of this sort. The present Section, however, includes cases in
which performance by the defendant is impossible, either subjectively
or objectively, and yet in which he is not discharged from duty. A
judgment for damages can be obtained against him; but specific per-
formance by him will not be ordered if such performance is impossible.
He will not be ordered to render a performance that requires action by
a third person who refuses to perform and who is under no duty to do
so.
b. The fact that a promised performance is a tort or a crime In
some cases precludes the existence of a contract; in other cases It does
not (see Sections 598-609). In either case, however, the remedy of
specific performance is not available.
c. There are cases in which the rendition of a performance due
to another under a contract would be the breach of a duty to a third
person, either of a fiduciary character or under another contract. If
the right of the third person is not for some reason inferior to the right
of the plaintiff, specific performance in favor of the plaintiff and in
breach of the third person's right will not be decreed. In some in-
stances of this sort, there may be a prorating of performances; and
specific performance of a part, with compensation for the deficiency,
may be decreed (see Section 365).
Illustrations:
1. A contracts to transfer to B an interest in land that he does
not own and has no power to transfer. B cannot get a decree against
A that he shall make a conveyance of that interest.
Annotation:
Where the performance, of a contract is in fact impossible, spe-
cific enforcement will, of necessity, be denied. Jenlins v. Dawes, 183
Ky. 25, 207 S. W. 689 (1919). Kentucky holds that where impossi-
bility is caused by neither the plaintiff nor defendant, specific per-
formance will not be decreed, but if the defendant causes the Impossl-
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bility, the court will, nevertheless, give the plaintiff performance as
near as possible to carry out the spirit of the contract, if practicable,
or will give the plaintiff damages. Burton v. Shotwell, 76 Ky. (13
Bush) 271 (1877); C. & 0. R. R. Co. v. City of Dayton, 177 Ky. 502,
197 S. W. 969 (1917). This section does not purport to cover the
cases where only a part of the promised performance can be ren-
dered. These cases are covered by Section 365.
A contract for the sale of land which violates a statute against
champerty will not be enforced. Cyrus v. Holbrook, 32 Ky. L. R. 466,
106 S. W. 300 (1907). Likewise, a contract by which one party binds
himself to settle on vacant land, procure a title, and then convey it
to another in violation of the laws granting lands to settlers will not
be enforced. McDermed v. McCastland, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 21 (1805).
Contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade will not be enforced.
Merchants' Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Rohrman, 138 Ky. 530, 128 S. W.
699 (1910) (Injunction to restrain breach of a contract not to engage
in the ice business). J.. H. Fields d Son v. F. G. Holland d Son, 158
Ky. 544, 165 S. W. 699 (1914) (Contract between two transfer com-
panies to limit competition). Torian v. Fuqua, 175 Ky. 428, 194 S. W.
359 (1917) (Covenant not to engage in like business so long as buyer
Is engaged in same business in a town named).
Section 369. Specific Enforcement Denied if Contrary to
the Public Welfare.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed if either the per-
formance to be compelled or the use of compulsion itself is
contrary to public welfare.
Comment:
a. Contracts contrary to public policy are generally unenforce-
able by any remedy; but there are cases in which the bargain would
not be held to be void, but which are nevertheless such that the per-
formance promised would be distinctly against public welfare. In
such cases specific performance may be refused, even though it may be
possible for the plaintiff to get a judgment for compensation in money.
Illustrations:
1. Two railroad companies, A and B, make a contract whereby A
promises to maintain a certain grade crossing. Later, traffic condi-
tions become such that the grade crossing is a public menace; and A
begins the construction of an underpass, interrupting B's traffic no
more than is reasonably necessary. An injunction or a decree for spe-
cific performance against A may properly be denied.
2. A effectively conveys a right of way to the B Railroad Com-
pany, the latter promising to locate a station at point X and to stop
all of Its express trains there. It turns out that X is an inconvenient
X. L. J.-5
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place for the public at large; and the location of a station and stopping
trains there will cause loss to B greatly disproportionate to any advan-
tage accruing to A. Specific performance may properly be denied.
Annotation:
As distinguished from contracts held by the courts to be illegal
-nd thus void, there are contracts which, while recognized as valid
and subject to the recovery of damages in case of breach, are yet so
contrary to public welfare as to cause a court of equity to deny spe-
cific performance, even though all the other requisites for such a
decree exist. It is with this type of contract that the above section of
the restatement deals, not with contracts void at law as being against
public policy; in such cases equity will, of course, refuse to grant
specific performance.
Our court refused to specifically enforce a contract between a city
and a gas company, whereby the gas company was to furnish gas to
light the streets, etc., over a long period of years, where it was shown
that the public interest and welfare would be better served by lighting
the streets with electricity. At the time the contract was entered into,
electricity had not been developed sufficiently for the uses contem-
plated under the contract. City of Newport v. Newport Light Co.,
14 Ky. L. R. 845, 21 S. W. 645 (1893); City of Newport v. Newport
Light Co., 17 Ky. I. R. 31, 30 S. W. 607 (1895) (Interpreting the prior
decision); Covington Gas Light Co. v. City of Covington, 22 Ky. L. R.
796, 802, 58 S. W. 805, 808 (1900). Similarly, where specific perform-
ance might seriously impede a common carrier from properly dis-
charging its duties to the public, it will be denied. Ecton v. Lexington
& F. Ry. Co., 22 Ky. I R. 1133, 59 S. W. 864 (1900) (covenant by de-
fendant railroad to erect and maintain a depot at a certain place; the
depot would not be convenient to the general public and probably
never of any substantial benefit, while interfering at least in part with
the general service of the railroad).
However, the promisee may, in the above cases, recover any dam-
age sustained by the refusal of the promisor to carry out the contract.
City of Newport v. Newport Light Co., supra. And, see the discus-
sion in Lexington & Big Sandy By. Co. v. Moore, 140 Ky. 514, 131 S. W.
257 (1910).
A contract by which one person binds himself to settle on vacant
land and procure a title and then convey it to another is against public
policy and will not be specifically enforced. McDermed v. MoCastland,
3 Ky. (Hardin) 21 (1805).
As to those cases where specific performance is refused because
the performance sought is tortious, or criminal, or the contract is
otherwise against public welfare, see the annotation to Section 368.
In connection with specific enforcement where the use of com-
pulsion in contracts for personal services is contrary to public welfare,
see Section 379.
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Section 370. Uncertainty of Terms.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed unless the terms
of the contract are so expressed that the court can determine
with reasonable certainty what is the duty of each party and
the conditions under which performance is due.
Comment:
a. Language is not so perfect an instrument that exact certainty
in expression can always be attained; nor does the existence or the
enforcement of a contract depend upon the attainment of such com-
plete certainty. It is enough that the parties have agreed in their ex-
pressions and that these expressions have a reasonably clear and defi-
nite meaning. The apiroach to certainty is made in varying degrees;
and to some extent the severity of the remedy that will be granted
depends upon the degree of this approach . ..
Illustrations:
3. A contracts to lease an dpartment to B as soon as the build-
ing Is completed and reasonably to heat and light it during the term
of lease. The building is completed except that A refuses to install
sufficient apparatus for heating and lighting. This contract is not too
uncertain in its terms, nor does it involve too great difficulty of super-
vision to justify refusal of specific performance on these grounds
alone . ..
Annotation:
The Kentucky decisions are in accord with this statement. The
majority of our cases concern the identification of tracts of land and
Involve the question of the Statute of Frauds.
In order that a contract may be specifically enforced, it must be
reasonably certain as to its subject matter, its stipulations, its pur-
poses, and its parties. Rankin v. Maxwell's Heirs, 9 Ky. (2 A. K.
Marsh.) 488 (1820); Fowler v. Lewis, 10 Ky. (3 A. K. Marsh.) 443
(1821) (contract incomplete); McKnight v. Broadway Investment Co.,
147 Ky. 535, 145 S. W. 377 (1912) (lease failed to specify the date
term was to start); Tharp University School v. Komus Realty Co., 159
Ky. 386, 167 S. W. 136 (1914) (the amount and terms of a first lien
and the time of maturity of a second lien were uncertain); Hall v.
Cotton, 167 Ky. 464, 180 S. W. 779 (1915) (description of land too in-
definite for identification); Weintraub v. Ware, 234 Ky. 169, 27 S. W.
(2d) 694 (1930) (indefinite provision with reference to assumption of
mortgage on property). For an interesting illustration of the phrase,
"that is certain which can be made certain", see Singer v. Campbell,
217 Ky. 830, 290 S. W. 667 (1927). The case is probably correct on its
facts.
In many cases, it may be said that the degree of certainty neces-
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sary to justify specific performance of the contract, rests, in fact, upon
the circumstances of the case, the desirability and need for specific
performance, public interest, etc.; in short in the sound discretion of
the chancellor. For example, see Schmidt v. L. & N. RV. Co., 101 Ky.
441, 41 S. W. 1015 (1897) (contract to operate a railroad, the contract
failing to fix the number of trains or other details of operation). Here
there was a strong public interest and need for specific performance.
As to contracts for the transfer of an interest in land, specific
enforcement will not be given unless the parties have described and
identified the particular tract of land which is to pass, or unless the
contract furnishes the means of identifying with certainty the land to
be transferred. Reed's Heirs v. Hornback, 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh.) 375
(1830); Stoner v. Taliaferro, 9 Ky. Opin. 90 (1876); Hall v. Cotton,
supra; Purtell v. Bell, 179 Ky. 356, 200 S. W. 644 (1918); Pope v. Myers,
218 Ky. 731, 292 S. W. 318 (1927). But, subsequent acts by the par-
ties, such as taking possession of the land, may render an uncertainty
in the contract certain, so that -equity will decree specific perform-
ance. Overstreet v. Rice, 67 Ky. (4 Bush) 1 (1868); Curry v. Kentucky
Western Railway Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 1372, 78 S. W. 435 (1904). And
the written contract often refers to other documents which identify
subject matter of the contract. Pertell v. Bell, supra.
The majority of the cases in Kentucky, as to contracts for the
transfer of an interest in land, deal with the problem of uncertainty
in connection with the sufficiency of a particular memorandum as a
satisfaction of the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. There are
many cases where the memorandum failed to sufficiently describe or
identify the land. Phelps v. Pinkston, 10 Ky. Opin. 26 (1878);
Wortham v. Stith, 23 Ky. L. R. 1882, 66 S. W. 390 (1902); Brice
v. Hays, 144 Ky. 535, 139 S. W. 810 (1911); Roberts v. Bennett, 166 Ky.
688, 179 S. W. 605 (1915). For cases holding the description in the
contract or memorandum uncertain but not too great, see Tyler v.
Onts, 93 Ky. 331, 20 S. W. 256 (1892); Henderson v. Perkins, 94 Ky.
207, 21 S. W. 1035 (1893); Hyqden v. Perkins, 119 Ky. 188, 26 Ky. L. R.
1099, 83 S. W. 128 (1904); Campbell v. Preece, 133 Ky. 572, 118
S. W. 373 (1909); Bates v. Harris, 144 Ky. 399, 138 S. W. 276 (1911).
The cases cited above by no means exhaust the list but are merely
representative. There can be no doubt that the section represents the
well-settled law in Kentucky. Each decision, however, rests upon its
particular facts and the court's interpretation of what is "reasonable
certainty" in relation to those facts.
Section 371. Difficulty of Enforcement.
Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the performance
is of such a character as to make effective enforcement unrea-
sonably difficult or to require such long-continued supervision
by the court as is disproportionate to the advantages to be gained
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from such a decree and to the harm to be suffered in case it is
denied.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in the Section does not attempt to indicate a
method of determining when the degree of difficulty is unreasonable or
how long a supervision is disproportionate to the gains and losses in-
volved. When the plaintiff's need is great, especially after part per-
fotmt nce rendered, or the public interest is involved, the court does
not shrink from the difficulties involved in continued supervision. In
such cases, structures may be ordered to be built and the continued
maintenance of railway facilities may be compelled. Increasing ex-
perience has shown that less hesitation on the score of difficulty of en-
forcement or length of supervision need be felt, and that attention
may well be concentrated on the character of the contract and the
purposes to be attained by granting or refusing specific enforcement.
See Section 359, with its Comment, and also Sections 370, 379.
Illustrations:
3. State A contracts with State B for the construction of an in-
terstate bridge over a large river. The interest of the inhabitants of
A, B, and other States are deeply involved. The officers of A refuse to
proceed because citizens have made objections. B may obtain a decree
ordering the officers of A to resume performance of the covenants of
the contract, to let the necessary contracts for construction work, and
to file a periodical report showing the progress made.
4. A, a realty company, sells a lot to B, contracting with him to
build a sewer for the premises. B pays the price and builds a house in
reliance on the contract A constructs an inadequate sewer system
endangering the comfort and health of B's family. The uncertainty
as to details of construction and the difficulty or long continuance of
the supervision are not necessarily so great as to make the remedy
of specific performance unavailable to B.
Annotation:
Our decisions are in accord.
Where the performance required by the contract is of long dura-
tion and its enforcement will require long-continued supervision by the
court, specific enforcement will be refused. Edelen v. Samuels, 126 Ky.
295, 31 Ky. L. R. 731, 103 S. W. 360 (1907) (contract to make and
sell whiskey over a long period); Haldeman v. Haldemath 176 Ky.
635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917) (contract to vote stock in specified manner
over long period).
However, although the performance required by the contract in-
volves the exercise of skill and judgment and a long-continued series
of acts, where the promisor is a public service company and the public
KENTUCKY LAW JOuJEAL
has an interest in the performance, the contract will be specifically
enforced. Schmidt, Etc. v. L. & NV. R. R. Co., 101 Ky. 441, 19 Ky. L. &.
666, 41 S. W. 1015 (1897) (contract to operate a railroad over a
long period of years); Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company v.
City of Hickman, 129 Ky. 220, 33 Ky. L. R. 730, 111 S. W. 311 (1908)
(Telephone franchise).
Where the plaintiff's need is great and it is not impracticable, nor
too difficult to render continued supervision, our court does not shrink
from the difficulties which such a decree will necessitate. Construc-
tion contracts will illustrate. In such cases structures may be ordered
to be built, rights of way maintained, etc. Apparently Kentucky is in
full accord with comment (a) supra, which will be found helpful. See
Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Zaring, 9 Ky. L. R. 107 (1887) (to
keep crossing in repair); Flege v. Covington, Etc., Bridge Company,
122 Ky. 348, 91 S. W. 738 (1906) (to erect and maintain a retaining
wall); C. & 0. By Co. v. Herringer, 158 Ky. 267, 164 S. W. 948 (1914)
(to put in crossings and keep them in good repair) (dictum). The
court in its discretion may order the promisor to build by a certain
date or pay the cost of erection. Such a decree is wise, since it will
often remove much of the necessity for supervision. Hagins v. Hewell,
124 Ky. 588, 99 S. W. 673 (1907) (contract to erect a party wall).
Where a crossing is to be built at a point to be selected by the
parties, the chancellor will decree specific performance and if they
cannot agree upon a location he will select one. C. & 0. By. Co. v.
Herringer, supra.
(To be Concluded in May Issue.)
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